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    Abstract— Both safety and non-safety applications require 
authentication of messages and vehicles in cooperative vehicular 
ad hoc networks. Access control can prevent external attackers 
from achieving their goal of breaking or hacking important 
information from road side units and self-driving vehicles. 
However, internal attacks on vehicular systems and networks 
remain possible. A novel intelligent intrusion detection is 
proposed to secure the external communication system of self-
driving and semi-self-driving vehicles. This system is based on 
the Integrated Circuit Metric technology, which has the ability 
to protect systems using features of the system itself. The 
detection system, called the ICMetric-IDS, is based on novel and 
unique features, which have been generated from bias values of 
magnetometer sensors as well as features which have been 
extracted from a trace file of simulated vehicle network traffic. 
Practical implementation and testing of the system demonstrate 
the efficiency in the detection of malicious behaviour. 
 
Index Terms—Intrusion detection, driverless cars, ICMetric, 
security. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Self-driving vehicles are poised to enhance the safety of 
passengers and drivers by reducing traffic jams and car 
accidents that are caused by human errors. These vehicles 
depend heavily on communication systems to exchange control 
data and sensitive information with Road Side Units (RSUs). 
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) represent this external 
communication system of self-driving and semi-self-driving 
vehicles [1].  
The application of VANETs in autonomous and semi-
autonomous vehicles ensures the success of this new generation 
of technology based on the security of the networks. Moreover, 
certain characteristics of VANETs have caused vulnerabilities at 
all their communication layers [2]. In other words, the external 
communication system has some properties that cause inherent 
security issues: speed of the car, mobility, high dynamic 
topology, absence of a fixed security system, open medium 
wireless communication and the sometimes large number of 
vehicles on roads [2]. In this case, intruders can launch their 
attack without physical access. In general, there are two types of 
communication in VANETs [3]: 
• Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications (V2V): Self-driving 
vehicles can directly establish communication wirelessly 
with one another forming V2V communication. 
• Vehicle-to-RSUs (V2R): Communication between the 
self-driving vehicles and their fixed RSUs. It is the 
formation of V2R communication that is used for the 
purpose of monitoring traffic and management services. 
Figure 1 shows an overview of VANETs for autonomous 
vehicles.  
Traditional systems do not possess the ability to provide 
protection to sensitive information or control data of 
communication systems or host computing devices from 
internal/insider attacks. This means that the role of the intrusion 
detection system (IDS) is to identify and prevent internal and 
external attacks on these systems that are seen as the second 
layer of security systems such as encryption/decryption. The 
external communication system of self-driving vehicles is 
affected by many vulnerabilities compared to other types of 
networks, such as wired networks, since there is no stationary 
security infrastructure; a high dynamic topology network and the 
open wireless medium makes them more vulnerable to attacks 
[2].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Communication system of self-driving vehicles. 
Integrated Circuit Metrics (ICMetrics) is an emerging 
technology to create a unique identifier for an electronic 
systems. Here such a feature has been extracted from the 
characteristics of magnetometer sensors for self-driving 
vehicles. ICMetric can be used both for identification and 
security purposes, akin to the electronic equivalent of a 
biometric technology [4]. 
In this paper, implementing ICMetric in IDS leads to the 
addition of a new dimension to current security systems. An 
ICMetric basis number is combined with traditional IDS to 
create a new and robust detection system to secure the external 
communication of driverless and semi-driverless cars. 
An ICMetric-IDS is proposed to establish security for the 
VANETs of self-driving vehicles. It is based on employing 
ICMetric technology in identifying external/internal attack and 
provides two key benefits: 
• Improving the authentication communication of driverless 
vehicles by creating an ICMetric which was extracted from 
bias readings of the magnetometer sensors. 
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• Designing an intelligent ICMetric-IDS that relies on the 
features of driverless vehicles. These features, that indicate 
either normal or malicious behaviour are extracted from 
trace files generated using a network simulator. 
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows: section 
two discusses related works; section three provides an overview 
of vehicular ad hoc networks; section four discusses the 
proposed ICMetric intelligent intrusion detection system; the 
methodology of the proposed security system is presented in 
section five, and simulation results are discussed in section six. 
The discussion of the results is presented in section seven. The 
final section is the conclusion. 
II. RELATED WORKS  
The emergence of driverless and semi-driverless cars which 
utilise vehicular ad hoc networks has attracted significant 
interest due to its direct and positive impact on society. These 
vehicles, for the most part, depend on the sensitive external 
communication with their environment in order to move and 
exchange warning messages. The external communication 
system that is used in these vehicles has characteristics that 
make it susceptible to various attacks [2]. The security problem 
in VANETs of self-driving and semi-self-driving vehicles  has 
been widely researched.  
Chaudhary et al. in [5] suggested a malicious intrusion 
detection that utilises fuzzy logic to secure mobile ad hoc 
networks MANETs. It can identify dropping attacks as well as 
isolated malicious vehicles from their Internet Protocol (IP) 
exchanges. The authors [3] propose an intelligent IDS to secure 
the external communication of self-driving vehicles and semi-
self-driving vehicles from any attacks. It possesses the ability to 
identify and prevent the grey hole and rushing attacks that have 
a direct and negative impact on lives of passengers, drivers and 
the vehicles themselves. This system depends on the 
characteristics of vehicles which have been extracted from the 
trace file. Zaidi et al. in [6] presented different aspects of 
security and privacy of vehicular internet that plays an important 
role in bridging all of the security holes. In [7], the researchers 
create an IDS to provide sufficient security to the routing 
protocol of self-driving and semi-self-driving vehicles. The 
system is deployed on the network layer for every RSU and car 
to provide sufficient protection for data and information from 
black hole attacks.  
Our research seeks to protect the external network of such 
vehicles from some types of attacks, such as Black hoke, Grey 
hole, Denial of Service (DoS) and Sybil attacks. It depends on 
the features of the trace file which have been generated from 
network simulator as well as a new ICMetric feature that was 
determined from the bias reading of magnetometer sensors on 
self-driving vehicles. 
III. OVERVIEW OF VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS 
The arrival of self-driving vehicles means that privacy and 
security are vital issues for VANETs, and these are of concern to 
many researchers. Autonomous vehicles send warning messages 
and Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) via wireless 
channels to communicate their status to other nodes in the radio 
coverage area. These messages are sent to determine the status 
of these vehicles to mitigate any risks. 
Self-driving vehicles’ communication configurations are 
heavily based on the acquisition of accurate broadcast data and 
control data of both, vehicles and the surrounding environment. 
In other words, these vehicles require up-to-date kinematic data, 
communication protocols and the aid of positioning systems for 
the efficient and reliable information exchange between them.  
Self-driving vehicles in VANETs are equipped with sensors, 
communication systems and On Board Units (OBUs) that work 
together for the provision of a wide range of services required 
by the vehicles and the infrastructure [8]. The communication 
system allows OBUs-enabled vehicles to send and receive 
messages to and from other vehicles or RSUs in that radio 
coverage area. These devices play a vital role in providing short-
range wireless ad hoc networks for the transmission of needed 
kinematic data and control data to the vehicular networks, thus 
facilitating traffic efficiency and safety on the roads indicated 
above [9]. In addition, self-driving vehicles are fitted with 
Global Positioning System (GPS) or Differential Global 
Positioning System (DGPS) receivers to process their position 
[10]. 
Fixed infrastructure such as the RSUs are connected to the 
backbone network, and are installed at strategic positions across 
the roads for reliability effectiveness and timely VANETs. 
Network devices are connected to the RSUs to support 
Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) using IEEE 
802.11p radio technology.  
IV. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
IDS are considered the second layer in any security system 
which has the ability to detect malicious behaviour [11]. These 
security systems have a significant role in the detection of many 
potential attacks on autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. 
The major concern in traditional security systems for example is 
that encryption/decryption alone does not have the ability to 
detect internal attacks [11]. 
The detection systems have been utilised to secure sensitive 
data using prevention mechanisms such as authentication and 
access control mechanisms. It can be classified as network-based 
(NID) and host-based (HID), according to the collected data set. 
In other words, the classification is based on the source of 
information detection. HIDs are configured on computers or 
hosts and they monitor an audit trail, while NID is based on the 
data that has been collected from network traffic.  
Detection schemes, such as anomaly detection and misuse 
detection systems, are utilised in the classification of IDS [12]. 
Anomaly or behaviour detection is based on normal traffic 
behaviour of self-driving vehicles in VANETs. Thus, it detects 
any active attacks by identifying that the system significantly 
deviates from its’ normal behaviour. Such behaviour is thus 
considered abnormal. 
Misuse or signature detection is based on predefined data or 
system vulnerabilities. It matches the traffic pattern with these 
signatures of abnormal behaviour and generates an alarm when it 
detects malicious behaviour in VANETs. The main drawback of 
misuse detection systems is that they cannot detect novel types of 
attacks; however, anomaly-based detection can detect a novel, 
not previously encountered attacks. In other words, it is based on 
rules instead of patterns, and can detect any type of abnormal 
behaviour in the external communication of self-driving vehicles. 
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Thus, this approach is able to identify not only known malicious 
behaviours, but also the unknown malicious behaviours. In 
addition, anomaly detection can detect intrusions that are 
achieved through the misapplication of legitimate users, without 
breaking security policies [13], [14].  
A high-false positive detection error is considered one of the 
limitations in anomaly detection system in addition to expensive 
computation and the difficulty of handling gradual misbehaviour 
[15]. In contrast, the misuse detection approach has many 
limitations such as inflexibility and difficulty of updating 
intrusion signature rules [14]. These strengths and limitations of 
the two approaches imply that effective IDS should employ a 
behaviour detector and a signature detector simultaneously [15]. 
In this paper, an anomaly detection system is proposed to secure 
the external communication of self-driving vehicles.  
V. ICMETRIC INTELLIGENT INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM  
The key problem with existing defensive mechanisms is that 
they are not sufficient for preventing the internal attacks in 
VANETs ,since they require additional protection systems like 
IDS to increase their security. The idea of the ICMetrics 
technology depends significantly on potential features, which 
have been extracted from the characteristics of a specific 
embedded system [16]. These features are viewed as a unique 
identifier, which is unique to the specific system it is generated 
for. Features are extracted and normalised to determine if they 
are truly unique and deterministic. Here, the focus is on utilising 
a magnetometer sensor that is typically found in modern 
navigation systems. 
In this paper, the bias reading that has been extracted from 
magnetometer sensor devices is utilised in the presented IDS. 
These bias readings were used to generate an ICMetric basis that 
was employed as identifications for driverless vehicles.  
There are six stages of the proposed detection system; the 
overall architecture of the proposed security system is illustrated 
in the figure 3.    
• 1st Stage (Generate ICMetric number) – The offset reading 
is extracted from the magnetometer sensors on autonomous 
vehicles. Mathematical and statistical functions are utilised 
to generate the ICMetric number from the extracted reading 
of the sensors. Additionally, the hash value is generated 
from the ICMetric number which will be employed in the 
ICMetric-IDS. Figure 2 shows the hardware setup 
composed of a myAHRS sensor which contains the 
magnetometer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Fig. 2: myAHRS_plus sensor. 
• 2nd Stage (real-world) – Two tools are used in creating the 
real world simulation, which are Simulation Urban Mobility 
(SUMO) and Mobility Vehicles (MOVE) that reflect 
mobility of vehicles. The output files from SUMO and 
MOVE are used as input to generate a trace file. 
• 3rd Stage (feature extraction) – The proposed ICMetric-IDS 
utilises only 16 significant features from the entire extracted 
features space [7]. Reducing the number of features plays an 
important role in enhancing the detection rate, decreasing 
error rate and false alarms.   
• 4th Stage (pre-processing): the significant features require  
pre-processing, such as: 1) transfer some symbols and letters 
to numbers, 2) uniform distribution to balance abnormal and 
normal records to increase the efficiency of IDS, 3) 
normalisation values of extracted features that are generated 
from the trace file to make the performance of ICMetric-IDS 
more efficient in identifying and blocking malicious 
behaviour.   
• 5th Stage (training phase- k-nearest neighbours (k-NN)): The 
k-NN is employed in designing the ICMetric-IDS. It is 
trained with extracted dataset which was produced in the 
third stage.  
• 6th Stage (testing phase-k-NN): The ICMetric-IDS is tested 
with the extracted features. The accuracy rate of detection 
and four types of alarms are calculated in the test phase. 
There are some criteria for measuring the efficiency of k-
NN, such as, detection rate, throughput, the number of false 
alarms, Packet Delivery Rate (PDR) and End-to-End delay. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Overall ICMetric-IDS architectural. 
The proposed system first determines the ICMetric basis from 
the magnetometer sensors. They are then integrated with CAMs 
from source node to the destination node. The behaviour features 
require a pre-processing phase and are then considered the input 
to the IDS. The IDS outputs are then considered normal or 
malicious. 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this experiment, the bias readings that were generated from 
the magnetometer (myAHRS_plus) sensors are employed in 
designing a novel IDS to identify internal/external attacks. The 
bias readings are extracted from the three identical sensors to 
generate the ICMetric, and 1000 readings were recorded for 
three different axes. In the testing phase, the extracted data is 
used to evaluate the anomaly detection in the VANETs.  
The detection accuracy rate and four types of alarms, true 
positive, false positive, true negative and false negative are 
calculated to evaluate the performance of the ICMetric-IDS. 
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Table 1 shows the detection rate and false alarm of the proposed 
ICMetric-IDS with the traditional IDS. 
 
 Table 1. Detection Rate and False Alarm 
 The significant improvement the proposed ICMetric-IDS can 
achieve is shown in Table 1 on the external communication of 
self-driving vehicles under various kinds of attacks with average 
error rate 0.72%. Table 2 shows the performance metrics of 
ICMetric-IDS. 
Table 2. Performance Metrics 
Performance Metrics          Throughput PDR Delay 
VANETs without-IDS          1.02%     0.05%    23.33ms 
VANETs with Normal-IDS   78.57% 97.86%      1.47ms 
VANETs with ICMetric-IDS 80.22% 99.64%    28.71ms 
All these IDSs are evaluated under abnormal conditions to 
calculate their performance metric.   
VII.  DISCUSSION 
The success and development of self-driving vehicles depends 
enormously on suitable security systems which provide a safe 
environment for external communication systems/VANETs.  
The average error rate of the IDS which utilises ICMetrics is 
0.72%. The rate of detection fluctuated between 98.78% and 
99.77% with efficient and excellent accuracy. The average false 
rate of alarm was very low, at about 1.21%, a further strong 
indicator for the good results.  
Meanwhile, the detection rate of the normal IDS fluctuated 
between 85.02% and 98.45% whereas the false alarm was 
12.24%. The detection rate is improved by using ICMetric 
technology with k-NN. Table 2 shows the significant role of 
ICMetric-IDS by calculating performance metrics: throughput, 
PDR and End-to-End delay.  
Comparing these results with the previous works of the authors 
[2], the here proposed ICMetric-IDS obtains a higher accuracy 
rate of detection with low rate of false alarms and errors in 
identifying malicious behaviour of autonomous vehicle.  
VIII. CONCLUSION  
An ICMetric-based vehicle sensing scheme which utilises the 
MEMS magnetometer sensor is proposed to protect the external 
communication of self-driving cars. In this paper, a novel car 
identification known as the vehicle ICMetric basis was utilised to 
idenfity the vehicle and designed for training and testing 
abnormal and normal behaviours which were built on the 
network simulator. The proposed scheme has the ability to detect 
external and internal attacks. The ICMetric-IDS is seen as a 
novel IDS which provides protection to the VANETs because 
this is the first time an ICMetric is utilised in the external 
communication of self-driving vehicles. The anomaly ICMetric-
IDS has shown acceptable performance in detecting malicious 
vehicles in the external communication of autonomous vehicles. 
Our proposed work can be extracted to design intelligent IDS that 
can detect and block other types of attacks such as Sybil and 
wormhole attacks. 
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Performance Metrics 
Detection rate False 
Alarm Normal Abnormal 
VANETs with Normal-
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  98.45% 85.02% 12.24% 
VANETs with ICMetric-
IDS 
99.77% 98.78% 1.21% 
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